



Abstract: Aristotle claims that in some extenuating circumstances, the correct
response to the wrongdoer is sungnōmē rather than blame. Sungnōmē has a wide
spectrum of meanings that include aspects of sympathy, pity, fellow-feeling,
pardon, and excuse, but the dominant interpretation among scholars takes
Aristotle’s meaning to correspond most closely to forgiveness. Thus, it is com-
monly held that the virtuous Aristotelian agent ought to forgive wrongdoers in
specific extenuating circumstances. Against the more popular forgiveness inter-
pretation, I begin by defending a positive account of sungnōmē as the correct
judgment that a wrongdoer deserves excuse since she was not blameworthy. I
will then argue that as sungnōmē is merited on the grounds of fairness, this
shows that both the forgiveness interpretation and a third, alternative interpre-
tation of sungnōmē as sympathy mischaracterize both the justification for
sungnōmē and its nature. Moreover, I will argue that Aristotle not only lacks
an account of forgiveness but in fact, his account of blame is incompatible with
forgiveness altogether.
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Aristotle opens Nicomachean Ethics Book III by declaring that some types of
action should receive praise and blame, while others instead deserve sungnōmē
and even pity (1109b30-32). In some extenuating circumstances, the correct
response to a wrongdoer (a descriptive term for any person who performs a
wrong action) is sungnōmē rather than blame (1110a23-26). Sungnōmē has a wide
spectrum of meanings that include aspects of sympathy, pity, fellow-feeling,
pardon, and excuse, but the dominant interpretation among scholars takes
Aristotle’s meaning to correspond most closely to forgiveness.1 Thus, it is
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commonly held that the virtuous Aristotelian agent ought to forgive wrongdoers
in specific extenuating circumstances.
Against the more popular forgiveness interpretation, I will, first, defend a
positive account of sungnōmē as the correct judgment that a wrongdoer deserves
excuse since she was not blameworthy. Second, I will argue that as sungnōmē is
merited on the grounds of fairness, this provides additional evidence that both
the forgiveness interpretation and a third, alternative interpretation of sungnōmē
as sympathy mischaracterize both the justification for sungnōmē and its nature.
Since fairness provides the justification for sungnōmē, it is inappropriate to
refrain from blame on the basis of fellow-feeling. Additionally, as blame is
unfair only in cases where the agent is not blameworthy, the wrongdoing
agent is excused but she is not forgiven. Moreover, I will argue that Aristotle
not only lacks an account of forgiveness but in fact, his account of blame is
incompatible with forgiveness altogether. Finally, I suggest that better under-
standing the nature of sungnōmē for Aristotle will shed light on the overlooked
topic of Aristotelian blame.
1 Sungnōmē and Judgment
Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics discusses the intellectual virtues, beginning
with knowledge (epistēmē), theoretical wisdom (sophia), and practical wisdom
(phronēsis), before turning in the later sections to accounts of deliberation
(bouleusis) and comprehension (sunēsis). To deliberate well is to reach the
correct conclusion about the appropriate means toward the final end, while
comprehension is accurate discernment of what practical wisdom commands.
Thus, the person possessing practical wisdom (the phronimos) is able to delib-
erate about what it is to live well, and thus knows how to act to promote her
final end (NE VI.5 =EE V.5, 1140a25-b22; cf. 1141b13-14). It is after this discussion
that another intellectual virtue appears, coupled with an explicit description of
sungnōmē:
What is called judgement [gnōmē], in virtue of which men are said to be sungnōmonas and
have judgement, is the right discrimination of the equitable [epieikous]. This is shown by
the fact that we say that the equitable man is above all others a sungnōmonikon man and
identify equity with sungnōmē about certain facts. And sungnōmē is judgement which
discriminates what is equitable and does so correctly; and correct judgement is that
which judges what is true.2 (NE VI.11 =EE V.11, 1143a19-24)
2 Here I follow W.D. Ross’s translation, slightly revised.
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Like the other virtues in the surrounding chapters of Book VI, gnōmē is
concerned with the excellent use of reason and, in particular, with judgment.3
Gnōmē is the cognitive ability to come to considered, sensible, and correct
conclusions, and the most salient case is the type of excellent judgment given
in judicial decisions by judges and juries, although everyday judgments of
blame and punishment are within the purview of the virtue as well.4
In his terminology, Aristotle here draws attention to the root meaning of
sungnōmē as “with judgment,” from the prefix sun- (with) plus gnōmē (judg-
ment). The prefix “sun-” indicates further that the particular type of judgment
Aristotle is addressing here is not only good judgment, but a particular kind of
good judgment: one regarding another person and where the opinion is with the
judged person (that is, on the side of the judged).5 Thus, the person who
possesses the virtue of gnōmē will know when it is equitable to judge both
that a wrongdoer does not deserve to be blamed or that she does deserve to be
blamed. When she is not deserving of blame, the judgment is said to be on her
side, and hence, the agent who possesses gnōmē is also said, in those situations,
to be sungnomōn.6 Thus, to give sungnōmē to someone is to assess correctly that
good judgment is on the side of the person under consideration. The judgment
takes into account not merely the action, but also its context and the agent’s
character and motivations, but no mention is made of any feeling of sympathy
the judge might or might not feel.
Aristotle then specifies the form that the correct judgment will take. A
person who employs sungnōmē correctly judges a situation by determining
accurately what the equitable action to take is, and thus “judging with” is
correct judgment precisely because it is what is truly equitable. Sungnōmē thus
3 See also Urmson (1988, 66). Generally speaking, gnōmē is concerned with all judgment
(whether good or bad), but since the discussion of gnōmē occurs in the middle of a chapter
focused on intellectual virtue, here it is clear that Aristotle is concerned with good judgment
rather than all types of judgment.
4 John Burnet and J.A. Stewart claim, respectively, that an agent with gnōmē is one with “fine
feeling” (Burnet 1900, 279) or “social sympathy” (Stewart 1892, v. II, 88–90), claims that seem
to undercut the essentially cognitive nature of gnōmē. That gnōmē is essentially cognitive and
not affective, however, seems to me to be clear from the fact that Aristotle’s discussion of gnōmē
occurs in the middle of a chapter focused on intellectual virtues. Moreover, since it is gnōmē
that Athenian jurors were required to use to judge correctly at trials, and it is a judgment that is
being issued, I conclude that we ought to have no doubt that gnōmē is a cognitive judgment.
5 See Burnet (1900, 279); Rackham (1934, 359); and Reeve (2013, 229).
6 Sungnōmonikon, the adjectival form of sungnōmē, may refer to the action deserving
sungnōmē, the agent deserving sungnōmē, or to the person who has a tendency to correctly
judge that sungnōmē is deserved.
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is a judgment that is equitable or fair (epieikeia), given when the person being
judged does not deserve blame or punishment.7
2 Justice, Equity, and Sungnōmē
Since epieikeia provides the content for a judgment of sungnōmē, exploring the
nature of equity and its relation to strict justice (dikaiosunē) is necessary for fully
understanding Aristotelian sungnōmē. The equitable agent knows how it is fair
to treat people across a spectrum of cases, while the judgment that an agent
deserves sungnōmē (as indicated by its literal meaning of “with judgment”) is
given in cases when the agent has done a wrong action, and yet she is not
blameworthy for this action. Both epieikeia and sungnōmē justify an overall
assessment of the agent, providing the basis for knowledge of whether it is
fair to blame and/or punish her (NE II.11, 1228a12-18; Rhet. I.13.17-18, 1374b).
Aristotle’s account of justice is explained in NE Book V= EE IV. After devel-
oping a systematic account of justice, Aristotle contrasts what is legally required
(and thus is merely accidentally just) with what is intrinsically just. To be
intrinsically just is much more difficult than acting in accordance with legal
justice, since it requires knowledge of what is just, knowledge of how to do just
actions in the right state and right way, and what is appropriate to allocate in
different circumstances (1137a9 ff.).
Aristotle next examines the nature of equity, which is what enables legal
justice to be rectified in cases where strict application of the law would not
result in absolute justice:
[what is] equitable is just, but is not the legally just, but a rectification of it. This is because
all law is universal, but in some areas no universal rule can be correct; and so where a
universal rule has to be made, but cannot be correct, the law chooses the [universal rule] that
is usually [correct], well aware of the error being made.8 (NE V.10=EE IV.10, 1137b12-18)
Strict legal justice is required to follow the letter of the law, even if a law
fails to account for a particular element of a situation that should mitigate or
eliminate the wrongdoer’s punishment. This sort of justice must allow the
punishment to stand, since this application is generally correct. If the legislator
herself were able to foresee all possible outcomes of her own law, the law would
reflect that punishment is not deserved here. However, in the particular type of
case discussed here, the law does not recognize the particular extenuating
7 I use both “equity” and “fairness” synonymously for epieikeia.
8 Irwin’s translation, slightly revised.
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circumstance. The judge must therefore correct what punishment and blame
would naturally seem to follow from application of the law, since she must give
blame and punishment in accordance with what true justice would require.
Thus, Aristotle concludes that the nature of equity is the “rectification of the
law insofar as the universality of law makes it deficient,” so the equitable is
what is just absolutely (1137b20-27).9 A judgment in keeping with equity or
fairness will take extenuating circumstances into account when deciding what
sort of sanctions are appropriate, ensuring that the initial intention of appro-
priate judgments, punishments, and blame are applied, even when the written
law would allow or require harsher treatment. Thus, an equitable person is
reasonable, even when the law would allow him to demand more compensation
from the person who harmed him, since he understands that, in this instance, to
demand what the law allows would go beyond what is fair (1137b35-1138a3).10
Aristotle expresses a similar idea in the Rhetoric, writing that equity is
“justice that goes beyond the written law,” since lawmakers cannot take into
account all possibilities when a law is drafted (Rhet. I.13.13, 1374a). Careless law
drafting and unavoidable vagueness due to the infinite number of indefinite
cases plague any attempt to deal with all wrongs systematically (1374a27 ff.). For
example, Aristotle offers the following example: a man might lift his hand or
strike someone while wearing a ring and thereby violate the technical letter of
the law, even if he did not harm anyone or intend for harm to happen.11 Strict
justice in accordance with the law would demand that he be punished, but
equity would recognize that he has not done anything worth punishing, since it
takes into account the circumstances that the law cannot.
Aristotle continues in the same passage in the Rhetoric by drawing the
connection once again between sungnōmē and equity: “it is clear what kinds
of actions are fair and what are not fair and what kind of beings are not fair:
9 Brunschwig (1999) and Hewitt (2008) offer detailed defenses of the further claim that this
absolutely just nature of epieikeia is also what is universally just, and not merely just for a
particular society.
10 Cf. NE V.9 =EE IV.9, 1136b17. Here the equitable person isn’t the judge or jury but the person
who was harmed or owed. He may take less than what he is owed of some good (e. g., money),
but he receives more of another good (e. g., reputation of what is fine), so it all becomes equal
in the end. As long as it is his choice to do so, he suffers no injustice even though he may
receive less of some good than the law allows.
11 Whatever the precise nature of the law, it is clear that the law has failed to account for some
aspect of the case that should exempt the agent from punishment or blame, and the equitable
judge would recognize this. One suggestion is a prohibition discussed by Quintilian against
“wounding with an iron instrument” (Cope and Sandys 1877, 256–7). Given ambiguity in what is
an instrument, the agent has broken the law, even though he is not guilty of any wrongdoing.
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those actions that [for which one] should sungnōmēn exein are fair” (Rhet. I.13.15,
1374b). Recognizing when an agent’s circumstances do not warrant punishment
or blame is necessary to judge correctly that an agent merits sungnōmē, and this
requires the ability to discriminate what is equitable on the basis of juridical
reason and not sentimental feeling.12
Concluding the passage in the Rhetoric, Aristotle writes:
And [it is also fair] to look not to the law but to the legislator and not to the word but to the
intent of the legislator and not to the action but to the deliberate purpose and not to the
part but to the whole, not [looking at] what a person is now but what he has been always
or for the most part. (Rhet. I.13.17-18, 1374b)
Determining whether sungnōmē is deserved is a complex process with an array
of factors to consider, including the cause of the action, the type of ignorance
involved, and whether the agent was pushed beyond what we could reasonably
expect of her. Both the judicial agent and the person making judgments in
his everyday life should not simply mechanically apply the law or the rule to
determine how to respond. The fair judge understands that even similar-seeming
cases may be quite different, once everything pertinent is accounted for, and she
responds appropriately to those distinctions. Thus, considering all of the relevant
aspects (not just the action, but also the agent, her motives, and the circumstance in
which she acted) is a part of fairness that the good judge must take into account.13
3 Sungnōmē and Action Types
Action classification gives guidance and insight into why an agent is or is not
deserving of sungnōmē, as Aristotle makes explicit in the final lines of the
passage. There Aristotle explains that classification distinguishing between the
types of actions laid out in this passage is important because “some involuntary
12 As Gauthier and Jolif (1959) note in their commentary, 432–433.
13 Shortly after he defines sungnōmē, Aristotle writes that a person possesses the faculties of
comprehension and correct discrimination of the equitable when she is “able to judge about
matters that concern the prudent person; for the decent is the common concern of all good people
in relation with other people” (NE VI.11 =EE V.11, 1143a30-31). Judging equitably and in accor-
dance with sungnōmē is not limited to legal determinations about the justness of punishment, but
more broadly in how we ought to judge and respond to a wide array of cases in everyday life. To
judge as the decent or equitable person would is to determine what is fair, and when, in a given
situation, it is fair that wrongdoer deserves sungnōmē, the person judging has acted equitably.
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actions are sungnōmonika, and some are not” (NE V.8 =EE IV.8, 1136a5-6).14
Since these action classifications are an important part of the explanation for
why some wrongdoers will receive sungnōmē for their actions and some will not,
it is useful to discuss the distinctions Aristotle draws between different types of
actions in both Books III and V.
In NE Book III, Aristotle explains three general types of action that deserve
sungnōmē: first, when an agent is forced to perform an action; second, when an
agent acts because of ignorance; and third, when her human nature is over-
strained. I will address the first two here, and return to the third case in § 5 after
I discuss a type of ignorance that is not excusing in § 4. In the case of force, the
action has an external origin and the agent contributes nothing. Since she
contributes nothing to the action, she is clearly not blameworthy for the action,
and so she receives sungnōmē (1110b2-3, 16–17).
While ignorance is grounds for sungnōmē as well, not all ignorant wrong-
doers will deserve sungnōmē. In determining where a particular case falls, what
matters is the type of ignorance, the reason for the ignorance, and the response
to the action afterward. To be eligible for sungnōmē on the basis of ignorance, an
agent must meet three conditions: the ignorance must be of a particular fact, not
a general principle (1110b31-1111a3), her wrong action must be caused by the
ignorance and not merely done in ignorance (1110b24-30; 1136a6-7), and the
wrongdoer must regret her wrong action (1110b19-24).
In NE V.8, Aristotle continues this discussion of the classification of actions from
NE III.1 amidst a larger discussion about justice and responses to varying types of
actions and agents. As in NE III.1, wrong actions done voluntarily or willingly are
blameworthy (1135a21), and involuntary actions are actions that are due to ignorance,
out of the agent’s control, or forced (1135a32-34), all types of actions eligible for
sungnōmē in NE III.1. And, as Aristotle argued in NE III.1, an agent cannot simply
act in ignorance but must act from ignorance to be eligible for sungnōmē. The specific
kind of case of acting in ignorance that he has in mind, however, is somewhat
different from the casementioned inBook III, and so Iwill discuss this case separately.
4 Unnatural and Inhuman Desires
Now that force and ignorance have been discussed as two grounds for sungnōmē, I
turn to another case involving ignorance. In this case, however, Aristotle explicitly
says that the wrongdoer is not eligible for sungnōmē. I will argue below that this
14 The connection between deserving sungnōmē and action classification is also explicit in
Rhet. I.13.15-16, 1374 where Aristotle lays out the same action classification as he does in NE V.8.
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wrongdoer is not eligible for sungnōmē because the agent is exempt from blame
altogether, rather than blame being forestalled in a particular case as with
sungnōmē. Contrasting these two cases serves to highlight precisely when and
why an agent who would normally deserve blame has blame forestalled by a
judgment of sungnōmē, whereas the agent discussed in the passage below is simply
not the type of agent who is ever eligible for blame in the first place.
At the end of NE V.8, Aristotle continues his discussion of the relationship
between ignorance and sungnōmē by singling out a particular type of acting in
ignorance that is not deserving of sungnōmē:
If someone’s error is not only committed in ignorance, but also caused by ignorance, it is
sungnōmonikon. But if, though committed in ignorance, it is caused not by ignorance but
by some feeling that is neither natural [phusikon] nor human [anthropinon], it is not to be
sungnōmonikon. (NE V.8 =EE IV.8, 1136a5-9)
Aristotle contends here that when an agent commits an error due to unnatural
or inhuman passions while he happens to be ignorant, he is not eligible for
sungnōmē. While the agent who acts from ignorance only acts because she is
ignorant, ignorance is not the cause of the behavior of the agent who acts in
ignorance. Aristotle’s example of what it is for an action to be committed in
ignorance and yet not from ignorance is that of an action that is caused by a feeling
that is neither natural nor human. Aristotle does not specify what inhuman or
unnatural desires are here, but he seems to be contrasting actions done from
inhuman feeling against actions done because of appetite or other naturally
human passions that were discussed just earlier in the section (1135b19-35).
Unnatural or inhuman feelings do not belong either to spirit or to reason but rather
to the appetites (1149b28-30).
Elsewhere Aristotle contrasts human and natural appetites with those that
are beastly and hence inhuman and unnatural (NE VII.6 = EE VI.6, 1149b27-
1150a3).15 An example of this type of brutish and irrational desire is found in
those who are insane and also in vivid examples of violations of human taboos;
while these are not human pleasures, the implications is that some beasts, at
least, might find these to be natural pleasures since they lack reason (NE
VII.5 =EE VI.5, 1148b19-24).16 Aristotle’s examples here include ripping open
15 Stewart (1892, 511) notes the connection between the passages in Book VII regarding beastly
actions and the discussion at 1136a5-9.
16 Cooper (2005, 17); Natali (2005, 108); and Curzer (2012, 383–6). Curzer thinks this is only
within a certain sphere, rather than a person lacking reason altogether, but that dispute need
not be settled here; what is relevant is that at least in the case of actions caused by beastliness,
the agent is unable to reason.
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pregnant women and eating their infants straight from the wombs (NE VII.5 =EE
VI.5, 1148b19-24).17 Unlike when the vicious person acts, it is not that the bestial
person’s best part (the intellect) is corrupted, but rather, that it is missing
altogether, and hence she is unable to be moved by decision at all.18 As
Aristotle implies, it is more frightening because such a person has lost what
makes her truly human: her reason. The virtues cannot apply to such an agent,
and to call her either temperate or intemperate would be a misnomer; she can be
neither virtuous nor vicious, since her action has no starting point (NE VII.1 =EE
VI.1, 1145a25-27, 1147b3-5, 1150a1-3; EE II.6.10, 1223a10-14).19
But since praise and blame only apply to agents capable of virtue and
vice, it now seems clear why such an agent is not eligible for sungnōmē
either – it is not fairness that rules out blame here but rather that she is the
wrong sort of creature to receive either praise or blame.20 What matters here
is her moral insensibility; she acts because of unnatural or inhuman feel-
ings and she lacks the rational capacity to choose or decide otherwise.21
Since she is incapable of decision, she cannot act either virtuously or
viciously, and hence neither praise nor blame are appropriate in the first
place.22 Unlike the cases of ignorance discussed before, the bestial person is
not the sort of agent who is eligible for blame in the first place. The bestial
person is thus exempt from blame entirely, though she does not receive
sungnōmē.
17 Thēriōdēs is coined by Aristotle here to describe someone “whose intellect is particularly
weak, subject to particularly disgusting appetites and fears” (Natali 2005, 104), although he
further notes that the adjectival form (to thēriōdes) is found in Plato (104 n3).
18 As Natali notes (2005, 123), this interpretation of the passage is held by “almost everybody.”
See also Curzer (2012, 69–70 and 383–384).
19 Cf. Pol. III.16, 1287a28-32; De An. III.3, 429a6; and MM II.6, 1203a18-29.
20 Given the extensive scholarly debate over whether Aristotelian praise and blame applies
only to those who act virtuously or viciously, it is beyond the scope of the present article to
defend my position that Aristotelian praise and blame applies only to those capable of virtue or
vice. Among those who have weighed in recently, see Irwin (1980), Sorabji (1980), Cooper
(2013), and Echeñique (2012).
21 See Broadie (2002, 352) and Sparshott (1994, 117, 240).
22 See NE II.5, 1105b30-1106a7; NE VII.6 =EE VI.6, 1149a25-b5; EE II.6, 1223a10-14; and Pol.
1253a3. Stewart holds that although such a person is not responsible, she does not receive
sungnōmē because her action is even more detestable than that of the vicious person’s (Stewart
1892, 511). However, Aristotle does not say that explicitly, and it is at odds with his claim that
beastliness is neither vicious nor virtuous (which are conditions of blame and praise), and also
his explanation that having a starting point requires reason, and without that, a person cannot
be virtuous or vicious. While beastliness is more frightening, this does not mean beastliness is
more detestable.
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5 Overstraining of Human Nature
Clarifying that wrongdoers might be exempt from blame even if they are not
eligible for sungnōmē highlights that sungnōmē is for agents who generally
meet the conditions of responsibility, but do not deserve blame in a particular
case. With this clarification in mind, I now turn to the final type of agent that
deserves sungnōmē. In addition to the types of actions that receive sungnōmē
discussed above (forced actions and actions committed from non-culpable
ignorance of a certain kind), the third type of case eligible for sungnōmē is
one in which an agent does what she ought not to do because her human
nature is overstrained. Aristotle explains this condition as one in which the
agent is stretched to the utmost, circumstances in which we could not expect
any human being to endure (NE III.1, 1110a23-26). She receives sungnōmē in
this situation precisely because it is the sort of circumstance in which we could
expect no agent to act well. Human nature, claims Aristotle, can only bear so
much, and in cases where an agent strains under pressure that any other
person would likely buckle under, it seems she should not be blamed in the
same way as if the wrong action were committed in circumstances that would
tempt no one except the vicious. The idea of overstraining is also found in
some situations that are so frightening that no one could resist, and thus are
“frightening to everyone—at any rate, to everyone with understanding” (NE
III.7, 1115b8-9). Thus, there are some human feelings and reactions for which
we expect certain responses from all people (including the virtuous), and not
merely the vicious or incontinent. In cases of both fear and of wrong action,
the overstraining is connected to the consequences, either from the feared
object or from what will happen if the wrong action is not done.
Unfortunately, as Aristotle acknowledges, it is difficult to determine which
negative consequences are truly so terrible as to stretch an agent past the
human breaking point and which an agent should have endured instead of
breaking (NE III.1, 1110a30). That this is difficult to judge, however, is precisely
why agents who habitually judge correctly must possess good judgment.
We are to refrain from blaming an agent who is overstrained not because we
feel sorry for the agent who gives in to temptation in such circumstances, but
rather, because it is fair that what a human being cannot be reasonably expected
to resist is not held against the agent. A wrong action committed in those
circumstances is not truly up to the agent, as Aristotle explains: “Being up to
oneself [to gar eph’ auto] is, and is wholly reducible to, what one’s nature is able
to bear. And what one’s nature is not able to bear and is not naturally within the
domain of one’s desire or reasoning is not up to oneself” (EE II.8, 1225a25-27).
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Thus the agent can be compelled to act either by rational compulsion (it would
not be rational to refrain from acting, due to the weightiness of the consequence
and how unweighty the wrong action is, for instance) or psychological compul-
sion (desires such as sexual desire or anger are sometimes so strong that they
overpower one’s nature). The human limits to withstand pressure are thus taken
seriously, and sungnōmē is given in cases where extenuating circumstances
exist, since “to sunginoskein human weakness is fair” (Rhet. I.13.17, 1374b).
The sheer difficulty of doing the right thing, however, does not by itself
excuse an agent. Rather, one further necessary condition is required for an agent
to be counted as having acted in a way that was not up to her: she must have
tried to avoid acting in the wrong way. This acknowledges that credit is due if an
agent actively tries to act rightly, as Aristotle notes: “For it is not surprising if
someone is overcome by strong and excessive pleasures or pains; indeed, this is
sungnōmonikon, provided that he struggles against them” (NE VII.7 = EE VI.7,
1150b5-8). To be worthy of sungnōmē, the agent cannot simply be overwhelmed
by pleasure and pain, but instead, he must actively fight against the temptation
rather than simply give in. It is only if he does so that he deserves any credit for
the extenuating circumstances he finds himself in. Thus, in cases where an
agent’s human nature is overstrained, he is eligible for sungnōmē on the grounds
that while he did his part to withstand temptation, no one could have acted any
differently in the circumstances. As a result, it is only fair that he receives
sungnōmē.
6 Sungnōmē as Excuse
Judging equitably considers all relevant facts to determine what an appropriate
response to an agent is, not simply by following the letter of the law but by
considering the motives and circumstances of the action. The virtuous judge
recognizes human nature and its limits, as well as extenuating factors; in all
three types of actions eligible for sungnōmē, the necessary criterion for eligibility
is that it would not be fair to blame the wrongdoer (either because she was
forced, ignorant, or overstrained). Since giving an equitable judgment is what
extending sungnōmē involves, an agent who employs sungnōmē correctly will
take the extenuating factors into account when considering whether blame is
appropriate or not.
Sungnōmē thus best corresponds to the contemporary idea of excusing,
since the justification for not blaming the agent is that although the action she
committed was wrong, she was not blameworthy for it. In contrast to exemption
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(when the bestial person is exempted from blame altogether because she does
not meet the reason requirement), a wrongdoer that deserves sungnōmē is
excused from blame in an individual situation because of particular excusing
conditions. Excusing is appropriate on the grounds of fairness and the judge
who correctly employs sungnōmē recognizes which excusing conditions are
relevant in the circumstances and which are not.
Many contemporary varieties of excuses, such as pity or mercy, are not
included since what is fair to excuse is determined not by affective response
to the wrongdoing agent, but instead by a cognitive judgment. The judge need
not feel pity, sympathy, or mercy in order to judge that someone merits
sungnōmē, so fellow-feeling is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition
for judging that an agent should not be blamed. A judge may lack sympathetic
feeling for a wrongdoer while judging him fairly, or be exceptionally sympa-
thetic to a wrongdoer and yet fail to judge equitably. In fact, as I will contend in
the next section, fellow-feeling frequently does undermine fair treatment of
wrongdoers. Thus, in relation to blame, sungnōmē is the correct judgment that
the agent who committed it deserves to have the blame that seemingly would
apply forestalled in a particular circumstance (“seemingly” because strict justice
would seem to demand it, but this fails to take into account the particular
circumstances, so strictly following the law or rule in this case would not be
doing justice).
7 The Case Against Sungnōmē as Sympathy
Now that I have defended a positive account for understanding sungnōmē as
judgment that excuses on the basis of fairness, I will address two alternate
interpretations (sungnōmē as sympathy and forgiveness) directly. While there is
little explicit discussion in the literature, the majority of scholars who refer to
sungnōmē in Aristotle’s account speak of it as forgiveness, pardon, or sympathy,
and not as excuse.23 I will now argue that these alternate interpretations are
23 Among English translations of either the NE or EE, C.C.W. Taylor’s translation of books II-IV
of the NE is the only one to use “excuse” for sungnōmē (instead of variations on either
“sympathy” or “forgiveness”). Both David Konstan and Charles Griswold also agree that
Aristotle’s usage of sungnōmē is closest in contemporary terms to “excuse,” but neither focuses
on fairness as the primary justification for excuse. See Konstan (2008, 244), where Konstan
claims that the relationship of status and power inherent in sungnōmē indicates it differs from
contemporary conceptions of forgiveness, and Konstan (2010, 23–30), where Konstan’s focus is
on the lack of emotional reconciliation inherent in Aristotle’s usage.
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misguided since they imply a reading of Aristotle that undermines the funda-
mental elements of sungnōmē found in the texts examined in the previous
sections. I will address sympathy in this section (§ 7) and forgiveness in the
following section (§ 8).
I turn first to examining why understanding sungnōmē as sympathy fails to
capture what is essential for Aristotle’s account.24 The common usage of sym-
pathy involves feelings of concern, pity, and sorrow for another person, and
thus sungnōmē understood as sympathy or sympathetic consideration suggests
that when sungnōmē is given, the motivation for giving up blame is a type of
fellow-feeling directed toward another’s suffering. Attempts to see the wrong-
doing agent’s perspective provide the basis for the mitigation or forestalling of
blame, based on the knowledge that we, too, might have been tempted by the
same feelings. Thus, sympathy involves seeing and understanding the circum-
stance from the agent’s point of view, and in response, feeling for the agent on
the basis of her suffering or misfortune, which may result in pity or the removal
of sanctions altogether.
Although Martha Nussbaum agrees with me that sungnōmē does not
demand anything beyond justice and that the correct way to literally translate
sungnōmē is as “judging with,” she takes sympathy to play an essential role in
sungnōmē. On her interpretation of Aristotle, sungnōmē requires the judge to
“see the events from the agent’s point of view,” and seeing the events from the
agent’s point of view, in turn, requires experiencing-with and feeling as the
wrongdoing agent does. She draws on Aristotle’s Poetics, arguing that it is
sungnōmē that makes it possible for us to feel pity and fear correctly and for
the spectator to enjoy tragedy. This leads her to the conclusion that sungnōmē
requires sympathetic identification with the wrongdoing agent.25
Since Aristotle thinks that we should feel pity only for those who deserve it,
appropriately feeling pity does require the ability to discriminate what is equi-
table (Rhet. II.8.2, 1385bff.). Nevertheless, it does not follow from the necessity of
possessing sungnōmē in order to judge correctly who deserves pity that making
the judgment requires correct feeling. The Poetics passage focuses on feeling
pity and fear appropriately in tragedies, not in drawing judgments about
24 Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe favor “sympathy” in their NE translation, and Martha
Nussbaum takes sympathy to play a role in her conception of sungnōmē as well (Nussbaum
1993). In his recent translation of the NE, C.D.C. Reeve combines elements of both “forgiveness”
and “sympathy” by employing “sympathetic consideration,” which he explains as being similar
to pardon or forgiveness, presumably because sympathetic consideration justifies the end result
of pardon or forgiveness.
25 Nussbaum (1993, 94–96).
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whether blame or punishment is fair, and the NE passages give no indication
that correct feeling is necessary for the judgment to be appropriate. While
fellow-feeling may certainly accompany the judgment, a judge who excuses a
wrongdoer because she feels sorry for him (and not because he deserves to be
excused on objective grounds) has not judged correctly. It is the judgment of
desert that justifies sungnōmē, not whether the judge sympathizes with the
wrongdoer.
Moreover, the usefulness of correct judgment for appropriately responding
to pitiful and fearful circumstances does not show that feeling as the alleged
wrongdoer does is necessary to judge correctly. Whether vividly feeling the
suffering of an alleged wrongdoer enables more equitable judgments is a sepa-
rate issue. Aristotle himself would reject this thesis, for reasons I discuss below.
For Aristotle, the task of a sungnōmonikos judge is to decide correctly when
a wrongdoer merits excuse, not to feel correctly toward the wrongdoer.26 Since
sungnōmē is justified on the basis of an impartial judgment of fairness, sym-
pathy suggests a motivation of fellow-feeling for the wrongdoer that is not
expected for Aristotle. Although the equitable judge will take the difficulty of
doing the right thing in challenging circumstances into account when determin-
ing whether blame is merited and Aristotle is concerned about human frailty, the
explanation suggested by the sympathy interpretation goes beyond this. While
the judge may seek to understand the agent’s motivations and the pressures she
faced, no feeling is necessary to the judgment; rather, the judgment is an
attempt to determine what is fair or reasonable tout court. Indeed, an attempt
to understand the agent through the lens of sympathy may cloud judgment
about what is fair, as flaws or faults are often overlooked, perhaps because we
are blinded to what is truly fair due to identification with the agent. Since the
wrongdoing agent herself may take her actions to be justified even when they
are not, taking on her perspective may result in the wrong conclusion. Thus,
sympathetic feelings do not help in judging whether blame is justifiably fore-
stalled, even if trying to impartially understand an agent’s motivations do.
Moreover, when we sympathize with an agent, sympathy may seem to
justify giving up blame even when equity would not (e. g., “I know he deserves
blame, but I can’t bring myself to blame him when he is feeling so down”), and
this sort of justification does not match Aristotle’s account. Since feelings of
sympathy can be offered even when blame is merited because the bad circum-
stances an agent is in are entirely her fault, the basis for judgment about
whether it is fair to blame or punish is not fellow-feeling.
26 This is the case even if the judgment might invariably lead to certain feelings (a conclusion
that is possible, although not supported by Aristotle’s text).
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While in some sense sungnōmē does require the judge to recognize the
wrongdoer’s point of view in order to understand why she acted as she did,
the correctness of the wrongdoer’s point of view determines how the judge
assesses her. As a result, feelings of sympathy and judgments that a wrongdoer
deserves excuse (sungnōmē) can and do come apart. For instance, it is perfectly
compatible with sungnōmē that the judge concludes it would be unfair to blame
the wrongdoer and yet the judge lacks any particularly sympathetic feelings
toward the wrongdoer. Similarly, it is also possible to sympathize with a wrong-
doer without thinking that he was justified in acting as he did. For example, if a
son murders his cruel father, the judge might well feel sympathy for the son’s
suffering while also recognizing that the son deserves blame since he was in no
way justified for murdering his father. This demonstrates that, unlike blame and
sungnōmē, sympathy and blame are compatible.
Additionally, Aristotle’s own text undercuts the case for attributing fellow-
feeling to Aristotle. In his discussion of reforming character and what makes the
virtuous person so, Aristotle worries about the persuasive power of feelings that
cannot be compelled to yield to argument but only to force. Someone who can
be persuaded by reason to yield when he is wrong has the sort of character
necessary for virtue, but the person who lives in accordance with his feelings
does not (NE X.9, 1179b27-32). When feelings are used as the method of judging
how to respond, they may diverge from what the virtue of judgment would
determine is best, precisely for the sorts of reasons I suggest above. Thus, while
sympathy may be useful in order to judge fairly or equitably, it is also, by
Aristotle’s lights, both unnecessary and possibly undermining since equity
requires judgment and not feeling.
Additionally, even commentators who explicitly translate sungnōmē as
“sympathy” do so on grounds that imply that the affective elements so impor-
tant to our ordinary conception of sympathy are not part of Aristotle’s account.
Despite connecting sungnōmē to sympathetic understanding and appropriate
feeling, Nussbaum’s literal translations of sungnōmē as “judging with” indicates
its essentially cognitive nature. Her description of the purpose of seeing from the
agent’s point of view also emphasizes the problem of judgment, not feeling:
taking the agent’s point of view is so that the judge “will begin to comprehend
what obstacles that person faced as he or she acted,” such as recognizing that
the act was committed involuntarily or that the agent faced a terrible moral
dilemma.27 Similarly, in Sarah Broadie’s commentary on NE III.1, she defines
“sympathy” as the “readiness to see the case from the agent’s point of view,”
which might be either on the basis of mitigating circumstances or on the basis of
27 Nussbaum (1993, 94).
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a defense of the action as a good one.28 In either case, the purpose of seeing the
wrongdoer’s point of view is to make salient to the judge the excusing features.
But this does not entail that the judge attempts to feel as the agent does, or even
tries to understand the agent’s feelings, but rather may simply mean that the
judge is trying to understand why the agent committed the action and why she
thought she was justified in doing so.29 Thus, I conclude both that there are
good arguments to reject the affective understanding of sungnōmē that sympathy
implies, and, moreover, that even some of those who understand sungnōmē as
sympathy do not require anything more than a cognitive judgment.
In § 8, I turn to the interpretation of sungnōmē as forgiveness or pardon. As
with the sympathy interpretation, I will argue that on the forgiveness interpreta-
tion of sungnōmē, the justification for giving sungnōmē would no longer be
fairness. Just as it is unfair to blame when it is not justified, it is unfair to refrain
from blame when it is warranted on Aristotle’s account, and so forgiving when
the agent still deserves blame is not appropriate. Thus, I conclude that forgive-
ness as paradigmatically understood is incompatible with Aristotle’s account.
8 The Case Against Sungnōmē as Forgiveness
The second alternate interpretation of sungnōmē is the most common, and on
this interpretation, Aristotle’s judge offers forgiveness or pardon to the wrong-
doer. Its ubiquity is reflected in the fact that “forgiveness” and “pardon” are the
most common translations of sungnōmē.30 I have already argued that sungnōmē
28 Broadie (2002, 311–12). The two ways this might be spelled out are not explicitly in the text;
as Broadie notes, Aristotle does not distinguish between them. Cf. Broadie (2002, 377).
29 Importantly, despite using the term “sympathy,” Broadie’s language seems to indicate that
the judge displays a consistently cognitive disposition to see the case from the agent’s perspec-
tive, and no indication that the judge takes the further step to try to understand the agent’s
feelings, to feel the agent’s feelings himself, or to assess how the agent ought to be judged on
the basis of the judge’s own feelings about the agent. Thus, while the choice of “sympathy” for
sungnōmē is misleadingly affective, Broadie’s gloss indicates that her picture of Aristotle’s
account matches my own, insofar as she sees sungnōmē as a cognitive judgment and not an
affective response.
30 Among common English translations of the NE and EE, W.D. Ross, Terence Irwin, Roger
Crisp, and Brad Inwood and Raphael Woolf all utilize “pardon” or “forgiveness,” with all but
Irwin using the two interchangeably. Gregory Sadler does explicitly articulate and defend the
claim that Aristotle has an account of forgiveness in Sadler (2008). Sadler’s defense that
Aristotle has an account of forgiveness relies largely on two claims: (1) “forgiveness” is a
common scholarly translation of sungnōmē and (2) “forgiveness” should include a wide variety
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is better interpreted as “excuse,” but I will now contend that understanding
sungnōmē as providing forgiveness or pardon is misleading for two reasons.
First, the status of the wrongdoing agent who is forgiven or judged worthy of
sungnōmē is different; forgiving an agent presumes she is blameworthy for her
wrong action, while a judgment that sungnōmē is warranted entails that the
agent is not blameworthy, despite the wrongness of her act. Second, lifting
blame by forgiving a wrongdoer does not require that the wrongdoer deserves
it, but this is incompatible with Aristotle’s requirement that blame is forestalled
only when the wrongdoer does not deserve blame.
All excusing conditions that justify sungnōmē for Aristotle entail that the
action was not up to the wrongdoer or that it was committed from non-culpable
ignorance, and so blame is forestalled. This picture of why blame is forestalled,
however, is not compatible with how forgiveness or pardon eliminates blame. To
show why this is so, I will explain how forgiveness is paradigmatically under-
stood and then contrast this both with excusing and with the features of
Aristotle’s account to demonstrate why Aristotle’s account of sungnōmē fits the
model of excusing and not of forgiving.
Forgiveness is a type of personal response to having been wronged or
injured. While numerous definitions of forgiveness have been offered in the
literature, I focus here on the central, paradigmatic ways of understanding
forgiveness. As Paul Hughes notes in his Stanford Encyclopedia article on
forgiveness, to forgive “refers to the act of giving up a feeling, such as resent-
ment, or a claim to requital or compensation.”31 On the standard view of
forgiveness, an individual overcomes resentment and retributive emotions
against the wrongdoer for moral reasons.32 What is central to forgiving is that
the forgiven agent has wronged the forgiver, and not in a way that might be
justified on the grounds of excusing conditions. The wrongdoer, in other words,
is blameworthy for the action, and when he is forgiven, the forgiving agent gives
up her right to hold on to resentment and other negative reactive attitudes that
may be directed toward the wrongdoer as a result of his wrong action.
of related concepts like excusing, pardoning, showing mercy, and forgiving. This section as a
whole is aimed at explaining why the common translation is misleading, and in so doing, I lay
out a paradigmatic account of forgiveness that distinguishes between relevantly different
concepts. In comparison to Sadler’s account of forgiveness, this account also more closely
tracks scholarly consensus.
31 Hughes (2015).
32 This simple formulation has been labeled “the standard view” by a number of sources,
including Darwall (2006, 72) and Kekes (2009, 488–90).
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Since the paradigmatic case of forgiveness is personal, the forgiver must be
the one harmed by the wrongdoer.33 If someone has harmed my neighbor, it is
not for me to forgive the wrongdoer, since the wrong was not done to me. This
highlights a further feature of forgiveness implicit in the discussion: forgiveness
involves a relationship between the wrongdoer and the injured party, and the
process of forgiving involves a change in status between them. This is a central
and widely acknowledged feature of forgiveness: the relational status between
the two cannot remain the same if the forgiver has truly forgiven the wrong-
doer.34 This does not entail that the forgiver must reconcile with the forgiven
person, but rather, that there is a change in the heart of the forgiver and so her
attitude becomes different toward the wrongdoer through the process of forgiv-
ing him.35 This involves both a change in the forgiver’s feelings and also in her
intentions and commitments toward the forgiven person, and thus the forgiver’s
cognitive and emotional attitudes are transformed.36
The forgiver recognizes both that the wrongdoer has acted wrongly and that
the wrongdoer is blameworthy for this wrong action. The agent’s blameworthi-
ness for the wrong action is important since forgiveness is not needed – indeed,
seems inappropriate – when the wrongdoer is excused. When an agent is
excused, an action that the offending agent committed but is not morally
culpable for is not held against him, but in forgiveness, one stops holding an
action that the offending agent is morally culpable for against him.37 When
circumstances excuse an agent’s behavior, the agent has no need of forgiveness
at all, since he has done nothing that is blameworthy. Thus, forgiving and
excusing are mutually exclusive since forgiving an agent presumes he is blame-
worthy, while excusing an agent entails that he is not blameworthy.38
It might be objected, however, that even in a case where someone is pushed
into a precious antique, which then breaks, it would not seem at all inappropri-
ate for the person who was pushed to express her sorrow and regret. But if she is
not initially blameworthy, then why would it be natural and appropriate for her
to do so? I agree that it seems natural for her to express her regret in such
circumstances. However, this need not be an apology or a request for forgive-
ness, but rather an expression of sorrow, both for her friend’s misfortune and the
33 As R.S. Downie puts it, “If A forgives B, then A must have been injured by B: this seems to be
a logically necessary condition of forgiveness” (Downie 1965, 128).
34 Morton (2012, 7–8), and see Hughes (2015) for further references.
35 The “change of heart” metaphor is extremely common; uses of the metaphor include (among
many others) North (1987, 500) and Murphy and Hampton (1988, 36–38 and 157).
36 MacLachlan (2008, 57–58).
37 Griswold (2007, 7).
38 For a denial of the necessity of blameworthiness for forgiveness, see Sadler (2008).
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unwitting role she has played in it. Aristotle himself also explicitly recognizes
that an expression of regret need not indicate blameworthiness either, since
expressing regret following an ignorant wrong action is a necessary condition
for sungnōmē. It is necessary precisely because it indicates that an agent who
acted wrongly did so only through ignorance – she regrets her action, and this
indicates that she would have acted differently, if only she had known the
relevant particular fact. Thus, while regret serves as a condition of being eligible
for sungnōmē in certain circumstances, it does not necessarily indicate
culpability.
Finally, it is important that the wrongdoing agent need not have completely
repaired the harm or whatever else might be required to deserve forgiveness.39
Rather, the forgiver may decide to forgive the wrongdoer even when the wrong-
doer could never repair the wrong in full or could never deserve to be forgiven.40
The forgiver does not issue forgiveness on the grounds of justice or fairness, but
she may give forgiveness on the grounds of mercy or compassion. As Vladimir
Jankélévitch notes, “the scandal of forgiveness is someone that does not ‘merit’
it,” which marks an important distinction between forgiveness (which need not
require desert) and excuse given on grounds of fairness (which does require
desert).41
One reason for the popularity of understanding sungnōmē as forgiveness
may have to do with a failure to distinguish between excusing, pardoning, and
forgiving. Doing so, however, is important, not least because, as I argued above,
forgiving and excusing are mutually exclusive actions. Given this, it is important
to be clear which of these sungnōmē justifies.
While “pardon” is sometimes colloquially used as equivalent to “forgive-
ness,” we can also distinguish different meanings associated with each. While
pardon relieves the offender of legal or formal punishment, forgiveness relieves
the offender of the victim’s pursuit of revenge, ill will, and other psychological
and emotional sanctions. Pardon and forgiveness are thus entirely independent
from one another, since being forgiven by an individual victim does not entail
pardon from the state, and pardon from the state does not depend on individual
forgiveness. Although pardon does not require that an agent actually be
39 If forgiveness could even ever be deserved – this is a hotly disputed topic.
40 Whether forgiveness requires guilt and remorse on the part of the wrongdoer is debated –
Griswold and Konstan, for instance, argue strongly that this is a requirement (see Griswold
2007, 121–2 and Konstan 2010, 5–14). This, however, is not essential here, since what is central
is that the wrongdoer can be forgiven even if there is no amount of remorse that would make up
the wrong or make it so that he deserves forgiveness.
41 Jankélévitch (2005, 94).
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blameworthy, it does require that she has been assessed as blameworthy. The
actual status of the agent’s blameworthiness is irrelevant to the point of a
pardon, however, which is to end the sanctions associated with a judgment of
blameworthiness.
Thus, while judging that sungnōmē is appropriate assumes that an agent is
not blameworthy, forgiving assumes the opposite (that the agent is blame-
worthy). Excusing an agent on grounds of fairness, however, assumes that the
agent is not blameworthy for her action. Thus, since neither forgiveness nor
pardon are compatible with the necessary judgment given by sungnōmē that an
agent is not blameworthy, I contend this shows one reason why Aristotle’s
account fits the model of excusing and not of forgiving or pardoning.
In addition to the status of the wrongdoer, there is a second way in which
the model of excusing fits the nature of sungnōmē, while forgiving does not: the
justification for blame’s removal. Whether to forgive or not entirely depends on
the forgiver’s willingness to give up blaming the wrongdoer. Since the wrong-
doer merits blame, it is not fairness that justifies forgiving. The forgiver may do
so because the wrongdoer recognizes his wrongdoing, apologizes, and has done
everything in his power to make it up, but if he has done serious harm, even that
hardly makes up for the loss. The would-be forgiver need not justify her reasons,
for forgiveness is beyond fairness, and so it can be extended even when the
offender does not and could never deserve it.42 The forgiver’s motivations may
vary, but it is important that possible motivations include mercy and compas-
sion, which may be motivated by the agent’s own virtue or simply by natural
feelings.43 In any case, fairness could not demand that she forgive, since
forgiving goes beyond what is deserved into what is undeserved.
Such forgiveness, however, is incompatible with sungnōmē, since sungnōmē
is limited by appropriateness conditions. For instance, Aristotle is clear that
sungnōmē is not to be given to agents who have acted viciously (NE V.8 =EE
IV.8, 1136a5-9; NE VII.2 = EE VI.2, 1146a1-4). The majority of Aristotle’s discus-
sion of sungnōmē involves laying out the conditions for its application, and since
sungnōmē is given on the basis of fairness, it is applied impartially to offenders
who merit it. This judgment is not made on the basis of fellow-feeling, like
42 There is a dispute about whether forgiveness can be earned, but I need not enter that debate
here, since my argument simply is that forgiveness can (and often is) extended in cases where
the offender could never earn it.
43 Of course, it is important to note also that forgiveness is not the same as mercy or
compassion; just as the forgiver need not be motivated by mercy or compassion to forgive,
mercy or compassion may motivate behaviors other than forgiveness (this latter point is due to
Hughes 2015).
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sympathy or compassion, and must be given only because it is fair. Unlike
forgiveness, sungnōmē is justified because the offender isn’t blameworthy in
the first place. Even if an agent wants to relinquish blame, it is not appropriate
for her to do so if it is not merited. Sungnōmē is given when deserved, but only
then, just as a judge may leave off punishing an offender only when the
circumstances warrant it.
Thus, I conclude that the structural role sungnōmē plays in Aristotle’s
account of blame is quite different than the role forgiveness would play. Unlike
sungnōmē, forgiveness is a personal response to a blameworthy agent, not to an
agent who does not deserve blame. Additionally, the justification for offering
forgiveness differs from that of sungnōmē, since forgiveness is not required by the
demands of equity. Moreover, equity is, in fact, incompatible with forgiveness,
since forgiveness would justify the giving up of blame on grounds other than
fairness. As a result, the common understanding of Aristotelian sungnōmē as
forgiveness is mistaken, and excuse justified on the grounds of equity is still the
best way to understand the nature of a judgment of sungnōmē.
9 Conclusion
Since sungnōmē is appropriate only on the grounds of justice, whether we ought
to praise, excuse, or blame in a particular circumstance depends on which of
those would be just or fair. Contrary to what translations such as “sympathy” or
“forgiveness” would suggest, the agent is excused from blame on grounds of
fairness alone and not because others feel sorry for her or wish to extend
compassion. In other words, it is not merely that others are willing to lift a
just sanction (e. g., as someone does when she forgives), but rather that it would
not be fair to blame the wrongdoer in the first place.
In concluding, I briefly sketch several implications for Aristotle’s ethics
more broadly. First, the importance of judgment for blame demonstrates that
excusing for Aristotle does not depend on how a judge feels or does not feel
about the wrongdoer, which highlights that Aristotelian judgments of blame-
worthiness depend on desert and not fellow-feeling. Second, since Aristotle’s
account of sungnōmē is fundamentally incompatible with forgiveness, any future
defense of the common claim that Aristotle does have an account of forgiveness
will have to find space for it elsewhere in Aristotle’s account. And third, since
judging that a wrongdoer deserves sungnōmē excuses the agent from blame on
the grounds of fairness, this shows that it is only appropriate to blame when it is
fair to do so. Thus, this justification of Aristotelian blame on the grounds of
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fairness provides new evidence that Aristotelian blame is not merely an instru-
mental tool to promote better behavior, but rather is a part of a plausible theory
of moral accountability.44
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